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AN ANALYTICAL INDEX OF PARALLEL REFERENCES TO THE CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SEVERAL COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA; With an Appendix containing a Collection of Cases Overruled, Denied, Doubted, or Limited in their Application. By SAMUEL LINN. Philadelphia: Kay & Brother, 19 South Sixth street, Law book-sellers, Publishers and Importers. 1857. pp. 768.

The object of this book can be best stated in the words of the author. "Its intention," says he, in his preface, "is to enable the student to refer from any given case or any given subject to all the subsequent cases wherein the principal case has been cited or commented upon by court or counsel, thus bringing into view at a glance most, if not all, of the later authorities on the same point. Every lawyer knows with what facility a principle may be traced backwards, through the books, by means of the references contained in the later cases to earlier authorities, how it can be thus followed up to its very source. But a principle cannot by the same process be traced forward, from its rise to its later development, for the very obvious reason that no case can refer to future cases which then have no existence. But by means of this simple arrangement a principle may be readily pursued through the books from its origin to its latest growth—from its infancy until it arrives at full stature.

Another advantage intended to be derived therefrom is the means which it will afford to test the value of any case, as authority for the principle which it purports to decide, by the references to all the subsequent cases wherein it is mentioned or commented upon in the opinion of the court.

The practical advantage and utility of the work cannot be better explained than by the following extract from a letter addressed to the author by the Hon. Geo. Sharswood :

"To be able to ascertain at a glance, whenever a case is cited, the extent of its authority, will make it an essential *vade mecum* of the practitioner; while to the student, the counsel, and the judge, to be thus assisted by references to all future cases in which the principal case has been cited, and relied on as authority, commented on, explained, qualified, doubted, shaken, or overruled, will so materially assist legal investigation that its importance can hardly be over estimated."

That such a book must be the result of much "patient labor" cannot be doubted, and nothing can be more true than Mr. Linn's observation that

"books of reports have become so voluminous, and adjudicated cases have multiplied so rapidly, as to render the labor incident to the investigation of questions daily occurring in practice, exceedingly irksome, and the difficulty is in no small measure enhanced by the irreconcilable and contradictory cases which are to be found scattered through the books. To this state of things the experience and observation of every judge and practicing lawyer will bear ample testimony."

Now, the only question is, does this book accomplish its design. If it does, no active practitioner in this State, or perhaps any other State, can afford to be without it. If it does not, it is worthless, and will serve only to mislead and embarrass. Let us, then, test it practically. Take any well known case—say *Steele vs. the Phoenix Insurance Company*, 3 Binn. 306. We turn to the case, and under it we find no less than *thirty* references. Here, at view, we see every case cited in which the principal case is discussed. Instead of slowly and painfully passing, as an unaided reader would be obliged to do, from book to book tracing his authorities, it is here done to his hand, and many weary hours economized. Take another case, equally well known—*Calder vs. Bull*, 3, Dall. 386. Here we have *twenty-five* references; another case, much more modern, *Braddee vs. Brownfield*, 2 W. & S. 271, here we have *sixteen* references; another, *Adlum vs. Yard*, 1 Rawle, 163: here we have *forty-six* references. Page twelve contains ninety-eight references; page one hundred and twelve, seventy-seven references; page two hundred and sixteen, eighty references; page four hundred and seven, one hundred and twenty-three references. The Index of Parallel References contains six hundred and sixty-eight pages, each page containing at least *seventy* references, or not far in the aggregate from *fifty thousand* references. When it is remembered that each reference has been carefully consulted, and most of them necessarily studied, the amount of "patient labor" is truly wonderful. We have taken the pains to study up one or two of the cases to see whether we could discover any omission, but our researches have not enabled us to find that any reference has escaped the diligence of Mr. Linn. It is not often that a professional book falls under our editorial attention that has challenged so much investigation at our hands, and has left so little to complain of. The design of Mr. Linn is fully and adequately accomplished, and the student hereafter will have nothing to do but to note on the margin of his copy any additional references, and he will always have an index of real practical value to aid him in his researches.

The Appendix of cases overruled, doubted, denied, commented on, and qualified, we have not yet had time to examine with any degree of care ; but we cannot doubt, from the admirable manner in which the former portion of this work is executed, that the remaining part is equally commendable.

PENNSYLVANIA STATE REPORTS, VOL. 27: Comprising Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. By JOSEPH CASEY, State Reporter. Volume III. Containing Cases decided in part of January and May terms, 1856 ; and in October term, 1856. Philadelphia: Kay & Brother, Law Booksellers, Publishers and Importers, 19 south Sixth street, east side. 1857. pp. 576.

Mr. Casey now gives us his third volume, which has much the same merit as the second one, and is certainly superior to the first. The Pennsylvania decisions have not in late years been remarkable for the manner in which they have been sent into the world by the official reporters to take their place in the lists of American jurisprudence. It is, therefore, with some satisfaction that we find a new reporter, perfectly competent, certainly, really endeavoring to make a series of creditable reports of one of the very first judicial tribunals in the country. The task of State Reporter is no sinecure, and no one is competent to pass judgment upon his editorial brother until he has himself attempted to report ; and when he sees the crude material, in the shape of hastily prepared paper books, and brief arguments hinted at and suggested, rather than stated, out of which he is expected to fashion a clear statement of facts, a methodical arrangement of arguments, and a well corrected opinion, he will not be disposed to find fault if sometimes a reporter fails in making his cases intelligible and exact.

A reporter cannot, with any amount of diligence, repair the mischances that occur to a case from the negligence or haste of counsel, the over-burdened judge taking for granted much that is plain to him and the counsel concerned, but not so obvious to a stranger to the case ; and he cannot be expected to master every thing that he is obliged to print. But Mr. Casey requires less allowance than usual, his labors being remarkably well executed.